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While media shaming of corporations which profit-shift to a tax haven is an obvious deterrent of 
such activity, governments need to change tax laws in order to have a real impact 
New research supports the long-held suspicion that using tax havens to enhance profitability 
makes sense for institutions financially, if not ethically. 
In their paper, The interplay between mandatory country-by-country reporting, geographic 
segment reporting and tax havens: Evidence from the European Union, the authors investigate the 
impact of public country-by-country reporting (CBCR) by banks operating in the European Union. 
The reporting rules were introduced in 2013 in the hope of allowing governments and regulators 
to better assess potential profit shifting by corporations seeking to minimise tax. 
The research indicates that, on average, European banks with tax-haven operations report 
significantly higher profit margins. There is also evidence of higher turnover per employee, higher 
profit per employee, and lower tax rates for operations located in tax havens, relative to non-tax 
havens. 
The OECD has stated that these measures are indicators of profit shifting. 
“It’s pretty clear and it’s highly significant from a statistical point of view that the operations in the 
tax havens are very profitable and the employees there are very productive,” says Rodney Brown, 
a lecturer in the school of taxation and business law at UNSW Business School. 
“The result is not super surprising, but it’s never been [possible to be] calculated with as much 
detail as we’ve been able to do for this paper.” 
Brown and his fellow authors – Bjorn Jorgensen, a professor in the department of accounting at 
the London School of Economics and Political Science, and Peter Pope, a professor in the 
department of accounting at Bocconi University in Italy – used hand-collected, country-by-country 
data to draw their conclusions, whereas in the past research into tax-haven impacts have largely 
been estimates based on aggregated data. 
WHAT EXACTLY IS A TAX HAVEN? 
The notion of tax havens is clearly not new, though there is some lack of clarity around what exactly 
the term constitutes. 
According to the OECD, a tax haven refers to a country which imposes low or no tax, and in which 
there is a lack of effective exchange of financial information and an absence of transparency in the 
operation of legislative, legal or administrative provisions. 
Brown et al’s paper examines tax-haven jurisdictions with “light-touch regulatory” regimes. The list 
includes economic strongholds such as Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Switzerland, Hong Kong 
and Singapore, along with names such as Bermuda, the Cayman Islands, the Channel Islands, 
Cyprus, Latvia and the Isle of Man, which have long had a reputation as dubious tax-haven states. 
The authors provide deeper insight into the location of EU banks’ businesses, including the extent 
to which they operate in tax havens. 
They make three key findings – first, the aforementioned higher profit margins of EU banks with 
tax-haven operations; second, that the introduction of CBCR rules has not led to changes in the 
number of geographic segments or country segments reported in banks’ annual reports; and third, 
the evidence suggests EU banks operating in tax havens “strategically aggregate” those 
geographic segments in a manner consistent with “obfuscation of tax-haven involvement”. 
In other words, they try to hide their tracks in their annual reports. 
HIDING THE TAX HAVEN TRACKS 
Brown says it is no secret that in the past many multinational corporations have played “funny 
games” to conceal their operations under accounting rules that have merely required them to 
prepare their financial statements under very broad geographical categories such as Australia, the 
Asia-Pacific, North America and Europe. 
That has led, in some circumstances, to business in smaller domiciles being lumped together with 
the reports of larger regions (for example, operations in Caribbean nations could be rolled together 
with North American financial statements, or Singapore and Hong Kong business could be part of 
wider Asia-Pacific operations). 
“So, it’s consistent with corporations aggregating all of their tax-haven operations into a bigger 
geographic pot within their financial statements,” Brown says. 
“And we haven’t been able to tell where companies are really operating and if they are operating 
in these dodgy locations.” 
There can clearly be a disconnect between where taxable profits are reported, and the location of 
a corporation’s actual economic activities. In this regard, the CBCR rules in Europe provide the 
prospect of greater transparency. 
“By making these banks report on a country-by-country basis, you’re going to get a much deeper 
insight as to where they’re operating,” Brown says. 
He points out that the EU directive is separate from another form of country-by-country reporting 
involving many OECD nations, including Australia, that requires firms to submit a non-public CBCR 
report to the tax authorities. 
Delving into the data for his paper, Brown says that though there is still often a lack of clarity around 
where banks hold their assets geographically, the reporting of employee numbers is illuminating. 
“So we can sit back and say, for example, that a company has recognised €20 million of profit in 
the Cayman Islands, yet it has only two employees there. Whereas the company reports €20 million 
of profit in Belgium where it has 500 employees. 
“How does that work? Those employees in the Cayman Islands must be super productive. But, 
clearly, the Cayman Islands finding is artificial and the company is reporting high profits there 
because it has a zero tax rate,” Brown says. 
WHAT REALLY NEEDS TO CHANGE? 
Six years since the introduction of the CBCR rules in the EU, Brown says it is apparent that the 
reforms have not stopped banks aligning themselves with tax havens. 
However, the changes facilitate a more extensive analysis of the geographic footprint of EU banks 
and enable identification of the countries where they operate, and critically, the level of activity 
disclosed in tax havens. 
He is confident the paper’s results will inform EU policy-makers currently considering the 
expansion of public CBCR to all industries. 
Brown adds that while media shaming of corporations which profit-shift to tax havens is the most 
obvious public deterrent of such activities, it will require further government policy actions to truly 
prompt change. 
“As it stands, these corporations publicly state that they fully comply with the prevailing tax 
legislation. So what they’re saying is ‘we’re following all the rules’. So if governments want to 
change the outcomes, they need to actually change the tax laws.” 
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